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what services they do in fact need,
price advertising can never give the
public an accurate picture on which to
base the selection of an attorney. Indeed, in the context of legal services,
such incompleted information could be
worse than no information at all. It
could be a trap for the unwary." 97
S.Ct. at 2710.
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court's
decision in Bates will have a far reaching
effect on the professionals's relationship
with those who need unique services. The
consumer has now the opportunity to
select an attorney based on the cost of the
services provided. Now the question must
be whether the legal profession will support or reject the Court's belief that dissemination of limited information, so long
as it is accurate, is better than continued
public ignorance and professional secrecy.

cease and desist such action or suffer untold consequences. The Commission did
not choose to enlighten the attorneys as
to exactly how they were violating the
Code. A formal grievance was not at that
time filed.
Legum, Cochran & Chartrand responded that they would not discontinue
publication of their announcement and

their position, the young associates innocently bantered among themselves of
possible adverse Bar Association reaction.
Imagine their consternation when they
received a letter from the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland instructing them that they were believed to be in
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and commanding them to
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On June 27, 1977 the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case of
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct.
2691 (1977), regarding legal advertising.
Those who thought the controversy over
advertising in the legal profession would
be settled by this decision were very much
mistaken.
On July 8, 1977 the Annapolis law firm
of LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND,
P.A. ran ad "A" in The Evening Capital.
This so-called advertisement merely
announced the addition of a new associate
to the firm. Maryland is one ()f relatively
few jurisdictions which still prohibits such
announcements in newspapers. Despite
Maryland's minority stance on announcement type ads the members of the firm
felt confident that their ad would be
above reproach. They regarded the ad as
entirely within the Bates decision on the
theory that permitting advertisement of
prices of routine legal services presumes
advertisement of existence. Confident in
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LEGAL SERVICES AT REASONABLE FEES

Simple Uncomplicated Will (No Trust Provisions) ............ .
Uncontested Divorce (No Dispute Concerning Grounds for Divorce)
Simple Separation Agreement (Without Negotiation) .........
Simple Power of Attorney ..............................
Preparation of Real Estate Sales Contract ..................
Preparation of Simple Deed .............................
Brankruptcy Preceedings-IndividualNonbusiness, Uncontested
Proceedings ......................................
Change of Name (Uncontested) ..........................
Adoption (Uncontested) ................................

$

35.00

.
.
.
.

250.00
100.00
25.00
25.00
15.00

.
.
.

350.00
75.00
250.00

The fee charges in other types of cases and in contested cases will depend on and
vary according to the individual circumstances of that case. The above fees are in
addition to court costs as assessed by the Clerk of Court.
Hours: Monday, Wednesday and Friday-9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Tuesday and Thursday-9 a.m. to 7 p.m.
Saturday-By appointment.
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additionally that they anticipated future
advertisements in compliance with the
guidelines established by the Supreme
Court. The announcement was published
subsequent to the receipt of the Grievance
Commission's letter.
The next move belongs to the Grievance Commission; but movement and
comment have not been forthcoming.
Stagnation is obviously not tolerated at
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND,
P.A. any more than is intimidation. On
July 28 ad "B" appeared in The Evening
Capital.
The jury is still out on this noteworthy
episode, but the verdict, no matter how
slow in coming, seems certain; lawyer advertising has arrived.

Medicaid
Funds
Aborted
by Janis A. Riker

As a result of two decisions by the
Supreme Court permitting States to
refuse to pay for non therapeutic abortions
with Medicaid funds, A Brooklyn Federal
District Court judge opened the doors for
Congressional action to prohibit Medicaid
payments for all abortions except those
cases where the life of the mother would
be in danger if the pregnancy were carried
to term.
In Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 236, (June 20,
1977), and Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2366,
(June 20, 1977), the Supreme Court held
that neither Title XIX of the Social
Security Act nor the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states partiCipating in the Medicaid
program to spend Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions.
Following these decisions regarding
state action, the Supreme Court ordered
the District Court judge to reconsider his
previous injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Hyde Amendment, which
limits federal Medicaid funds for abortions
to those in which the life of the mother is
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in danger (Department of Labor and
Health, Education and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, sec. 209, Pub. L.
No. 94-439 (1976)). As a result the injunction was withdrawn. The Hyde
Amendment remained in effect only until
September 30, 1977, but Congress is
deadlocked in considering a continuation
of its restrictions on abortion funding.
Further Congressional action to limit
federal payments for abortions would be
necessary if Congress wants to prohibit
states from using Medicaid funds. The
Court held in Beal that Pennsylvania's
refusal to provide Medicaid coverage for
non therapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, but that the statute does permit a
state to provide such coverage if it so
desires. The Hyde Amendment prohibited
such coverage, however, for the current
fiscal year.
The 6-3 Beal decision (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissenting) is
based on the Court's interpretation of the
language of the statute itself, the intent of
Congress and the federal agency interpretation of the statute.
Quoting the statute's specific language,
the Court concludes that the act confers
broad discretion upon states to adopt
standards for determining the extent of
medical assistance provided.
Noting that nontherapeutic abortions
were unlawful in most states when Congress passed Title XIX in 1965, Justice
Powell said in the opinion that it was not
likely that it was the intent of Congress to
require states to fund nontherapeutic
abortions.
Furthermore, unless there are compelling indications that the agency interpretation of the statute is erroneous, the Court

will follow its construction, and the
Department of Health, Education and
Welfare concluded that Title XIX permits,
but does not require, funding of nontherapeutic abortions.
In its companion Maher deCision, the
Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution does not require a state partiCipating in Medicaid to
pay for nontherapeutic abortions even
though it pays for childbirth. It is this
holding which provides the basis for
federal legislation restricting abortion
coverage by Medicaid funds.
A regulation of the Connecticut
Welfare Department limiting state
Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary" (a term defined to include psychiatric
necessity) was challenged by two indigent
women who were unable to obtain physicians' certificates of medical necessity.
A three-judge District Court panel enjoined the state from requiring a certificate of medical necessity for Medicaidfunded abortions, holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires a state to fund
nontherapeutic abortions if it generally
provides for funds for medical expenses
related to pregnancy and childbirth.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding
neither discrimination against a suspect
class nor interference with a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution.
In its "strict scrutiny" analysis, the
Court said that it has never held that financial need alone creates a suspect class
for equal protection purposes.
Most importantly, the Court stated that
the fundamental Constitutional right protected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) was a woman's freedom to decide
to terminate her pregnancy, not an unqualified right to the abortion itself. Roe
prohibits undue state interference with a
woman's decision to have an abortion, but
it does not impose an affirmative obligation on states to make abortions available.
Justice Brennan in his Maher dissent
argues that the Connecticut statute infringes on the woman's constitutionally
protected right of privacy by placing financial presssures on indigent women to
carry their pregnancies to term. However,
the six-justice majority concluded that
Roe did not limit a state's authority to use

